Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves and Long Term Growth by Polterovich, Victor & Popov, Vladimir
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Accumulation of Foreign Exchange
Reserves and Long Term Growth
Victor Polterovich and Vladimir Popov
New Economic School
2003
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20069/
MPRA Paper No. 20069, posted 18. January 2010 10:49 UTC
Victor Polterovich and Vladimir Popov1
 
ACCUMULATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AND LONG TERM 
 
GROWTH 
 
 
 
 
     ABSRACT 
 
Cross-country regressions, reported in this paper for 1960-99 period, seem to suggest that the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (FER) contributes to economic growth of a developing 
economy by increasing both the investment/GDP ratio and capital productivity. We offer the 
following interpretation of these stylized facts: (1) FER accumulation  causes real exchange rate 
(RER) undervaluation that is expansionary in the short run and may have long term effects, if such 
devaluations are carried out periodically and unexpectedly; (2) RER undervaluation allows to take 
full advantages of export externality and triggers export-led growth; (3) FER build up attracts 
foreign direct investment because it increases the credibility of the government of a recipient 
country and lowers the dollar price of real assets. A three-sector model of endogenous economic 
growth (including a consumer good sector, investment good sector and an export trade sector) is 
suggested to demonstrate how undervaluation may improve social welfare. Concepts of FER 
accumulation trajectories and equilibrium trajectories are introduced. It is demonstrated that small 
udervaluation of the equilibrium exchange rate may be wealth improving.  
                                                 
1 New Economic School, Moscow.  
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ACCUMULATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES  
AND  LONG TERM GROWTH 
       
1. Introduction 
     Whereas it is widely recognized that devaluation can increase output in the short run, bringing 
actual output above the potential level, it is generally assumed that in the long term growth rates of 
output do not depend on the exchange rate. On the contrary, the exchange rate itself in the long run 
is considered as an endogenous variable determined by the growth rates of prices and outputs in two 
countries. Nevertheless, there is a strong empirical evidence (provided below) that the accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves (FER) leads to lower exchange rate, which in turn stimulates export-
led growth. Countries with rapidly growing FER/GDP ratios, other things being equal, exhibit 
higher investment/GDP ratios, higher trade GDP/ratios, higher capital productivity and higher rates 
of economic growth.  
     The FER build up should be financed - either through a government budget surplus or via money 
printing, or through the accumulation of debt. In either case, there is a net loss in the current  
consumption because a part of potentially available resources is not used. Besides, accumulation 
leads to a gap between the money supply and the goods sold at the domestic market. This gap may 
results in inflation or should be financed by additional regular taxes, expenditure cuts, or debts that 
should be finally paid. So if FER accumulation not only stimulates economic growth, but results in 
the increase of total welfare, it should be considered as a puzzle: by limiting consumption today it 
becomes possible to increase the integral discounted consumption. The analogy may be with the 
Keynesian policy of fiscal expansion that takes the country out of the recession. In words of Joan 
Robinson, when the government of a country in a recession hires the unemployed to do any kind of 
work, even totally senseless (digging the pits and filling them with soil again), the actual GDP 
approaches the potential GDP. In a similar way, it appears that under certain conditions 
(externalities associated with international trade and/or various kinds of traps in which developing 
countries often find themselves due to market failures) the authorities/central bank can boost 
economic growth by under-pricing their exchange rates via FER accumulation. The important 
difference with the standard Keynesian effect, of course, is that here we are talking about long-term 
growth rates of GDP, not about the deviation of actual from potential income.  
    In this paper we have in mind the following explanation why the exchange rate under-valuation 
can promote long-term economic growth. First, accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has the 
conventional short term expansionary effect - relative prices of tradables increase with respect to 
prices of non-tradables and to wages. In the long run this effect disappears as increased profits are 
invested and lead to increased demand for non-tradables and labor. But if there are subsequent 
unexpected rounds of FER build up, the long term growth rates may increase. Second, 
undervaluation of the currency stimulates the increase in exports. This increase in exports raises 
accumulated knowledge due to the learning by doing externality and therefore economic 
productivity as well. The rate of growth rises and this more than compensates the potential gain 
from spending reserves for current needs. Third, undervaluation lowers foreign currency prices of 
domestic real assets and thus attracts foreign direct investment. Besides, continuing FER build up 
(especially in periods of terms of trade deterioration) gives a powerful signal to investors that the 
government is in full control of the situation and can afford costs for the sake of pursuing a 
consistent policy. Technologically backward countries on obvious reasons have much more to gain 
from export externality and from the inflow of foreign direct investment. That is why benefits of 
reserve accumulation should be especially promising for developing countries. 
     The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature and the 
basic stylized facts on the dynamics of foreign exchange reserves, exchange rates, relative prices, 
investment/GDP ratios and economic growth.  Section 3 contains the results of cross-country 
regressions for the period 1960-99 that examine the relationship between reserve accumulation and 
economic growth and deals with the endogeneity problem.  In section 4 we suggest a three-sector 
model of endogenous economic growth with a possibility for the exchange rate to deviate from 
equilibrium level; this model demonstrates the theoretical plausibility of the discussed effects. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Review of the literature and stylized facts 
     Undervaluation of domestic currency is a common feature for most developing and transition 
countries. Unlike in mature market economies, in most poorer countries the exchange rates of 
national currencies are low as compared to PPP (table 1).  
Table 1. Ratio of actual exchange rate of national currencies in $US to PPP for selected 
countries in 1993, % (figures in brackets - for 1996) 
Countries/regions Ratio, % Countries/regions Ratio, % 
OECD* 116 Transition economies* 81 
  - Germany 126 (133) -Central Europe* 54 
  - Japan 165  (158)  - Bulgaria  30  (25) 
  - U.S. 100  (100)  - Croatia 65 (94) 
  - Portugal 73    (77)  - Czech Republic 36  (48) 
Developing countries*  44  - Hungary 62  (63) 
-Asia* 36  - Poland 48  (59) 
  - India  24   (23)  - Romania 31  (34) 
  - Indonesia 30   (33)  - Slovak Republic 37  (47) 
  - Korea 72  (81)  - Slovenia  69  (78) 
  - Malaysia       (44) -USSR* 91 
   - Philippines  35 (34)   -Armenia       (20) 
  - Thailand  43 (45)   - Azerbaijan       (32) 
  - Turkey 54  (48)   - Belarus 8    (30) 
-Latin America* 46   - Estonia 29  (64) 
  - Argentina       (90)    - Georgia       (29)** 
  - Brazil       (70)   - Kazakhstan       (39) 
  - Chile       (43)   - Kyrghyzstan       (19) 
  - Mexico 58  (45)   - Latvia 27  (50) 
  - Peru       (56)   - Lithuania 19  (47) 
  - Venezuela       (36)   - Moldova 14  (28) 
-Middle East* 83   - RUSSIA 26  (70) 
  - Kuwait       (67)   - Tajikistan       (3) 
  -Saudi Arabia       (68)   - Turkmenistan       (45) 
 - United Arab Emirates       (100)   - Ukraine  19  (39) 
-Africa* 37   - Uzbekistan       (22) 
  - Ethiopia      (20) China 22  (20) 
  - Mozambique      (17) Mongolia       (21) 
  - Nigeria 36 (90) Vietnam        (20) 
* 1990.  ** 1995. 
Source: UN International Comparison Program (Russian Statistical Yearbook 1997. Moscow, 
Goskomstat, 1997, p. 698; Finansoviye Izvestiya, November 10, 1995); World Bank, 1998; 
Transition Report, 1997. 
For resource rich countries, however, there is a danger of "Dutch disease", which arises 
because resource export is so profitable that it allows to earn a trade surplus even under the 
overpriced exchange rate. Thus, Middle East countries (mostly oil exporters) are the only major 
group of states in developing world with the exchange rate close to PPP (table 1). 
   There is a number of explanations why equilibrium exchange rate in poorer countries is well 
below PPP rate (Froot, Rogoff, 1995). On a theoretical level, references are usually to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect (smaller productivity gap between developing and developed countries in non-
tradable goods sector than in tradables, but equal wages in both sectors) and to Bhagwati -Kravis-
Lipsey effect (non-taradables, which are mostly services, are more labor intensive, so if labor is 
cheap in developing countries, prices for services should be lower)2.  
   The Balassa-Samuelson effect states that, if productivity grows faster in sectors producing 
tradable output (mainly goods) than in sectors producing non-tradable output (mainly services) and 
if wage rates are equalized across sectors - with the result that economy-wide real wage increases 
lag behind productivity growth - then the real exchange rate (RER) can appreciate without 
undermining business profits.  
     A similar explanation was recently developed for transition economies to which the Ballasa-
Samuelson effect can hardly be applied directly, since the services sector in such economies was 
generally underdeveloped before transition and was expected to show stronger productivity gains 
than the traded goods sector. Grafe and Wyplosz (1997) argue that even if the appreciation of the 
exchange rate in transition economies undermines business profits (in the export sector and in 
industries that compete with imports), this should not necessarily lead to a deterioration of the 
current account, since the need for capital accumulation in transition economies declines - that is, 
they can operate with lower savings ratios than they could before the transition. Indeed, the 
evidence shows that the ratio of investment to GDP was abnormally high in most centrally planned 
economies because of the need to compensate for low capital productivity (Shmelev and Popov 
1989) and that, in virtually all cases, when these economies move into the transition phase, 
investment ratios initially fall. Even after a country’s recovery, its investment ratio usually does not 
return to the levels that existed prior to the reforms (Popov 1998a). Even though the decline in 
investment-to-GDP ratios has now ended in most transition economies, Halpern and Wyplosz 
(1997) argue that real appreciation in transition economies will continue until the transition is over, 
which may be “decades away.” 
   Another study (ESE, 2001) found evidence of Balassa-Samuelson effect in transition economies 
of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union in the 1990s. The period is too short, however, and the 
                                                 
2 For the general description and references see: (Krugman, Obstfeld, 1994, Ch. 16). 
 
increases in RER that actually took place in most transition economies may be the reaction to the 
overshooting initial devaluations that occurred in the beginning of the 1990s, when convertibility 
was introduced. The increases of the relative prices of services that occurred in many countries were 
most probably caused by previous “distortions” in relative prices (housing, health care, education 
were virtually free) rather than by faster growth of productivity in manufacturing than in services.  
    As fig. 2.1 below suggests, there is an obvious relationship between GDP per capita and the level 
of national prices to the US prices (RER) - this correlation exists not only for non-tradables, but also 
(although a bit weaker) for tradable goods. But it is difficult to detect the effect of RER appreciation 
for particular countries even for the period of 25 years - as fig. 2.2 illustrates, even in fast growing 
developing countries RER was generally declining, driven more by the deterioration of terms of 
trade than by Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
There are other, more prosaic considerations explaining the low level of RER, such as price 
controls, exercised by many developing countries for non-tradables (housing rents, education, 
health care, transportation, etc.); capital flight and debt service payments that increase the demand 
for  foreign currency and create a downward pressure on the exchange rate of the national currency; 
externalities, such as higher crime rates and greater risk in developing countries that limit the 
demand for non-tradables.  
 
 
Fig. 2.1. PPP GDP per capita in 1999 and the ratio of domestic to US prices of tradables 
and non-tradables in 1993, %
R2 = 0,6582
R2 = 0,723
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000
PPP GDP per capita in 1999, dollars
Ra
tio
 o
f d
om
es
tic
 to
 U
S 
pr
ic
es
 o
f 
tr
ad
ab
le
s 
an
d 
no
n-
tr
ad
ab
le
s,
 % Cloth-dom/US
Health-dom/US
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2.  Ratio of official to PPP exchange rate (LCU per $1) in 1975-99 for groups of 
countries (unweighted average)
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On the other hand, many other developing countries (including those rich in resources) 
pursue the conscious policy of low exchange rate as part of their general export orientation strategy. 
By creating a downward pressure on their currencies through building up foreign exchange 
reserves, they are able to limit consumption and imports and to stimulate exports, investment, and 
growth. To put it differently, there are generally two major reasons for relatively low exchange rates 
- (1) the generally lower level of development, leading to lower prices of non-tradable and perhaps 
even tradable goods and  imposing the burden on the balance of payments in the form of the capital 
flight and debt service payments (non-policy factor) and (2) the governments/central banks 
conscious policy to underprice the exchange rate in order to use it as a instrument of export-oriented 
growth (policy factor). 
    At an intuitive level udervaluation of the exchange rate seems to be a way to encourage exports, 
restructuring, and growth, while fighting inflation through tight fiscal and monetary policy 
(sterilization of increases in money supply caused by the growth of foreign exchange reserves), not 
through highly priced national currency. Undervalued currency - the necessary component of export 
led growth. It used to be the strategy of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore some time ago, when 
those countries were still poor and were catching up with high income states. This is currently the 
strategy of many new emerging market economies, especially that of China, which continues to 
keep the exchange rate at an extremely low level (20-25% of the PPP rate) by accumulating foreign 
exchange reserves at a record pace. It is by no means an accident that all very fast growing 
economies are also famous for high and rapidly growing international reserves: China and Japan 
accounted in 2005 for over 1/3 of total world FER, East Asia - for over half; reserves to GDP ratio 
for these countries is normally above 20% as compared to below 10% for the world as a whole. 
     Similar arguments were made with respect to transition economies. Hölscher (1997) believes 
that EE countries can gain from underpricing their national currencies drawing on the West German 
experience with undervalued mark in the 1950s. Pomfret (1997) argues that undervalued exchange 
rate in China during the reform period (since 1978) was the powerful factor of stimulating 
economic growth. Some scholars concluded that the overvaluation of the Russian ruble in 1996-98 
was the major reason of the Russian 1998 currency crisis (Illarionov, 1999; Montes and Popov, 
1999; Popov, 1998a; Shmelev, 1999). Indeed, unlike in East Asian countries, where economic 
recession followed devaluation, the reduction of output in Russia started nearly a year before the 
devaluation of the ruble in August 1998; one month after devaluation output started to grow.   
 Rodrik (1986) developed a model demonstrating how disequilibrium exchange rate in the presence 
of foreign trade externalities could lead to the acceleration of growth3. It was shown for developing 
countries that overvaluation of the exchange rate is detrimental for economic growth by including 
the variable that characterizes the undervaluation of the exchange rate into standard growth 
regressions (Dollar, 1992; Easterly, 1999).  
   Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere, Rogoff (2006) examine mainly the impact of volatility of the real 
exchange rate on productivity growth, but also look at the impact on growth of under/overvaluation 
of the exchange rate (the measure of overvaluation is basically the residual from the regression of 
RER on the GDP per capita – to control for the Balassa-Samuelson effect – and a couple of regional 
dummies. They find that overvaluation of RER negatively affects economic growth, especially in 
poorer countries.  
     Overall, there were only 5 poor countries, all of them in East Asia, that succeeded in catching up 
with the “rich club” in recent half-century (Japan and four Asian tigers - Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan) - all of them were rapidly accumulating reserves. Only 7 countries in the 
world increased their GDP per capita in 1960-99 at a rate higher than 4% a year (table 2) and all 
                                                 
3 In this early paper Rodrik assumes the import externality, which is used via the overvaluation of the 
exchange rate that stimulates imports of machinery and equipment. There is no doubt this import 
externality exists, especially at the early industrialization stages, but there are only limited opportunities to 
reap this externality through overvalued exchange rate because such an overvaluation would lead to the 
trade deficit and the depletion of reserves. Rather, the appropriate way to use this externality is to set 
these countries, except Japan, increased FER at a high pace, had relatively low domestic prices and 
prices for non-tradables due to the undervaluation of their currencies, and experienced rapid 
increases in export/GDP and investment/GDP ratios. Japan that was not growing in the 1990s, but 
accumulated reserves until 1994, may be an exception that proves the rule.  Similarly, the ratio of 
domestic to US prices that was high in Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore in the last quarter of the 
20-th century, was much lower in the preceding 25 years.  
Out of 17 countries that demonstrated growth rates of GDP per capita of 3% and higher 
(table 2) there are more exceptions - in addition to Japan these are Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal 
and Spain. These are developed countries, which obviously - due to better investment climate and 
EU membership - had ways to increase capital productivity that were beyond the reach of poor 
countries. Mauritius and Indonesia also managed to achieve high growth rates with relatively low 
investment/GDP ratios, which requires explanation.  Otherwise, however, the data are very 
meaningful.  
 
 
Table 2. Some macroeconomic indicators for rapidly growing countries in 1960-99 
Countries Annual 
average 
GDP per
 capita  
growth 
 rate, % 
Increase in
FER/GDP 
 ratio, p.p., 
 1960-99 
Average  
FER/GDP
 ratio, % 
Highest 
FER/ 
GDP 
ratio in 
1960-99,
 % 
Average
FER in  
months 
of  
import, 
1975-99 
Ratio of 
PPP to  
official  
exchange 
rate in  
1975-99, %
Ratio of 
prices of 
health  
care and 
clothing, 
1993, % 
Ave- 
Rage 
Export 
/GDP 
 ratio, 
 % 
Increase 
export/ 
GDP 
 ratio,  
p.p. 
Average
Invest-
ment/ 
 GDP 
 ratio,  
% 
Countries with average annual growth rate of GDP per capita of over 4% 
Botswana 6,13 86,93  
(1976-99) 
68,89 
 (1976-99)
121,82  
(1998) 
13,64 53,86 66,9 41,83 3,88 27,61 
China 4,94 13,72  
(1977-99) 
8,68  
(1977-99)
16,31  
(1999) 
7,36 38,26  11,76 20,77 
(1970-9
31,31 
 Hong Kong, 5,12 27,59  
(1990-99) 
42,74  
(1990-99)
60,56  
(1999) 
3,61 83,03 80,8 103,37 48,8 27,33 
Japan 4,18 2,37 3,42 6,76  
(1999) 
3,54 115,98 54 11,20  -0,34* 32,01 
Korea, Rep. 5,82 14,17 5,89 18,21  
(1999) 
2,11 58,23 38,9 25,08 38,9 27,93 
Singapore 5,87 72,76 60,55 90,52 
 (1998) 
4,76 93,93 52,3 163,66 41,96 
(1965-9
34,57 
Thailand 4,51 14,44 14,75 27,97  4,47 41,69 25,3 41,63 26 27,98 
                                                                                                                                                 
different tariffs for final products (high) and intermediate products (low) or to subsidize imports of 
machinery directly. 
(1997) 
Countries with average annual growth rate of GDP per capita of 3 to 4%%         
Hungary 3,11 27,59 (199 14,18  
(1983-99)
22,67  
(1999) 
3,52 36,05 57,5 38,06 22,44 
 (1970-99)
28,79 
Greece 3,36 9,90 6,83 15,64 
 (1994) 
3,86 69,99 49,69 14,42 10,76 27,02 
Indonesia 3,43 19,09 (196 6,65 
 (1967-99)
23,89  
(1998) 
3,36 42,54 38,4 22,04 19,9 22,34 
Ireland 3,89 -11,22 14,61 22,51 
 (1977) 
2,46 93,99 94,3 49,20 57,9 18,71 
Luxembourg 3,06    -3,61 (192,10 
 (1984-99)
4,29  
(1985) 
0,03 123,23 62,5 103,7 
6 
14,4 18,43 
Malaysia 3,91 24,55 21,26 42,13  
(1993) 
4,19 59,12  58,80 71,1 27,83 
Mauritius 3,30 6,94 14,53 32,32 
 (1991) 
2,74 42,99 81,9 50,29 36,9 22,83 
Norway 3,03 6,94 10,57 22,56  
(1985) 
3,91 125,96 89,8 38,19 2,22 22,83 
Portugal 3,83 -9,31 26,77 51,40  
(1979) 
2,86 56,78 72,2 24,98 15,28  
(1960-98)
24,66 
Spain 3,31 1,80 8,18 13,06 
 (1997) 
5,25 80,05 69,2 15,56 19,2 23,13 
*In 1960-84 the ratio increased by 4,09 p.p.   
Source: WDI.  
 
Whatever the reasons for the equilibrium dynamics of the RER in poorer countries, and 
whatever are the equilibrium patterns of this dynamics, it is clear that the monetary authorities can 
influence these patterns through the accumulation of FER. If Balassa-Samuelson effect really holds, 
countries accumulating reserves, other conditions being equal, will experience smaller increases in 
RER since the policy of the central bank in this case would be to prevent the appreciation of the 
national currency. It is important to realize that the accumulation of FER is an indicator of the 
deviation of the actual exchange rate from its equilibrium level (defined as a level, which ensures 
the balance of payment equilibrium without the change in reserves), although this equilibrium level 
itself for developing countries is lower than the PPP rate and also may change in time, approaching 
the PPP rate.  
     The argument against a policy of low exchange rate is that the accumulation of reserves leads to 
monetary expansion and hence - to inflation. Calvo, Reinhart and Vegh (1995) argue that 
undervaluation of the exchange rate is inflationary in theory and was inflationary in practice for 
Latin American countries in the 1980s. Sterilization is often viewed as a self defeating policy, since 
it is achieved only at a cost of higher domestic interest rates, which in turn leads to the greater 
inflow of capital, the need for the new sterilization and thus even higher interest rates, etc. 
However, in practice sterilization is usually carried out by countries exercising some kind of capital 
control, either administrative or in the form of the Tobin tax, which makes sterilization policy 
efficient. It appears also that countries that accumulated FER faster than others usually financed 
such accumulation with a government budget surplus and thus managed to escape high inflationary 
pressure. Data for all countries (see below) do not show any link between the accumulation of FER 
and inflation.  
 
3. A closer look at stylized facts - cross-country regressions 
   All data are taken from the World Bank tables (WDI, 2001). We have observation for about 100 
countries for the period of 1960-99, but for some countries the values of particular indicators for 
particular years are missing. We kept the country on the list, if the number of missing observations 
for the 40-year period was less than 20.  
   (1) Explaining the level and change of FER. To begin with, foreign exchange reserves as a 
% of GDP (whether converted at official or PPP exchange rates) vary dramatically (fig. 3.1). The 
average ratio of FER to GDP for 1960-99 ranged from several percent of GDP to several dozen 
percent (Hong Kong - over 40%, Singapore - over 60%; Botswana - 69%; by the end of 1999 
Botswana had reserves over 100% of GDP). In East Asian countries the ratio of reserves to GDP in 
general increased in the course of recent four decades, whereas in African and Latin American 
countries foreign exchange reserves grew less rapidly than GDP. 
     If reserves are needed to ensure smooth foreign exchange operations, as the theory suggests, it 
might be expected that smaller countries with higher foreign trade would have relatively (as a % of 
GDP) higher reserves4. In practice, however, this is not the case: there is practically no relationship 
between FER/GDP ratios and the GDP itself, no matter whether it is measured at PPP or official 
exchange rates. Similarly, the FER adjusted for the size of international trade of the country 
                                                 
4 The standard  formula for explaining FER is , where Y is income, O is the 
measure of openness of the economy (external trade to GDP ratio), 
δγβα σ iOOYFER ∗∗∗=
Oσ  is the volatility of openness, and i 
is the opportunity costs of holding foreign exchange reserves (difference between the interest rate earned on 
FER invested into short-term low risk securities and interest rate on alternative investment), and 
δγβα ,,, are respective elasticities.  It is interesting to note that collapse of the Bretton-Woods fixed 
exchange rates  system in 1971 did not have a large impact on the demand for FER (Grennes, 1984, Ch. 
22). 
(measured in month of imports) differ considerably - from less than one month to over 1 year. 
Botswana, for instance, in the late 1990s kept enough reserves to support import for 24 months, 
whereas Jamaica with similar magnitude of international trade (40-50% of GDP) was unable to 
finance its import even for 2 months.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Overall the reserve to GDP ratio in the world fluctuated markedly in recent 40 years due to 
changes in gold prices and is currently at a level of 6 to 7% - a little bit higher than in 1960 (fig. 3. 
2). If gold is excluded (it's share in total reserves dropped to about 10% today and only in the US 
the share of gold is at a level of about 50%), the upward trend is quite visible - from 2% in the 
1960s, when the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was in place to about 4% in the 
1970-80s, when the world switched to floating exchange rates, to 6% in the 1990s, when capital 
flows increased dramatically.  
 
Fig. 3.1. Foreign exchange reserves as a % of GDP, average ratios for 1960-99
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 Fig. 3.2. Share of gold in reserves in the world and in the US (%, left scale) and the ratio of 
foreign exchange reserves to GDP in the world (%, right scale) 
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     Is there a rationale, except for the goal of ensuring the stability of the external transactions, for 
differing magnitude of foreign exchange reserves? FER are correlated with imports (with exports - 
as well, but the correlation is much weaker, adjusted R2 is 26% and 13% respectively - fig. 3.3), but 
are not correlated with many other variables that are supposed to explain the level of reserves (table 
3). We tried the volatility of external trade, terms of trade, net fuel imports, the current account, 
private capital flows, total debt and short-term debt, debt service payments, international and 
domestic interest rates - neither of the indicators was statistically significant (not shown in the 
table). GDP per capita and the indicator of investment climate acquire the negative sign - the worse 
is the investment climate, and the poorer is the country, the more rapid is the growth of reserves. To 
put it differently, other things being equal, poor countries with poor investment climate should 
increase FER faster (probably using them as a collateral) than others. The average level of FER to 
GDP ratio for the long term period (1960-99) has a negative impact on the change of FER in 1975-
99, which is in line with the intuition – countries with high level of FER did not need to increase it.  
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Fig. 3.3. Average ratio of imports to GDP and average ratio of reserves to GDP in 1960-99, 
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 For the 1975-99 period, for which more data are available, the best equation explaining 
changes in FER is shown below: 
]/[(3.0)/(2.03.0lg2.6)/(4.039 90849960 YTYTICIYYRR ∆++−−−=∆ −− ,       (1) 
R2=50%, N=72, all coefficients significant at 3% level or less, where: 
p.p.,99,-1975inratioDPreserves/Gin theincrease the-−∆R  
Y - initial (1975) GDP per capita,  
T/Y - average ratio of foreign trade to GDP over the period, 
]/[ YT∆  - the increase in the same ratio over the period, 
R/Y60-99- average ratio of FER to GDP in 1960-99,                          
ICI84-90  - average investment climate index in 1984-90 (ranges from 0 to 100, the higher, the better). 
 
Then we consider the residual from this equation, R∆ pol, as the policy induced change in 
foreign exchange reserves. The logic behind such an approach is to net out changes in reserve/GDP 
ratio caused by objective circumstances, such as the level of development and investment climate, 
the accumulated level of FER and the level and dynamics of foreign trade. Afterwards we used the 
policy induced change in foreign exchange reserves as one of the explanatory variables in growth 
regressions. In this way we deal with the possible endogeneity problem: policy-induced change in 
reserve to GDP ratio in 1975-99 could be regarded as an exogenous policy variable.  
      It remains to be said that the accumulation of FER is financed in practice5 through government 
budget surplus and debt accumulation, but not through money printing, since inflation is not 
significant as an explanatory variable (table 3). That is to say, most countries that accumulated 
reserves rapidly exhibited low inflation, and low budget deficit (or budget surplus), but growing 
government debt. 
 
Table 3. Factors explaining the level of FER in 1960-99 and the sources of FER  
accumulation - cross country OLS regression results  
 
Dependent variable Average 
 ratio of  
FER to  
GDP in  
1960-99, 
 % 
Average 
 ratio of  
FER to  
GDP in  
1960-99,
 % 
Increase in  
the ratio of  
FER to GDP
from 1960 
to  1999, p.p.
Increase in 
the ratio of  
FER to  
GDP 
from 1960 
to 1999, p.p
Increase in  
the ratio of  
FER to GDP
from 1960  
to 1999, p.p.
Number of observations 172 122 62 58  
Average budget surplus 
 in 1960-99, % of GDP 
  0.55* 1.0*** 1.07*** 
Average government  
debt in 1960-99, % of  
GDP 
   0.08* 0.09** 
Average annual inflation 
 (GDP deflator), 1960- 
99, % 
  0.05   0.07 
Average import of goods
 and services, % of GDP 
0.29*** 0.32***    
2000 investment  
climate index, ICRG, % 
 0.18**    
Constant  0.09 -13.1** 7.1*** 5.6** 4.5* 
Adjusted R2 26 32 2 8 7 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
                                                 
5 Formally, the following identities hold:  
∆M=∆FOREX+∆BCB
BD = ∆BCB + ∆BP
∆FOREX = ∆M + BS + ∆BP, 
where ∆FOREX – increase in foreign exchange reserves, ∆M – increase in money supply, BS – budget 
surplus (BD – budget deficit), ∆BP – increase in bonds held by the public, ∆BCB  - increase in bonds held by 
the central bank.  The last identity implies that the increase in foreign exchange reserves can be financed by 
the increase in money supply, i.e. inflation tax on everyone (∆M), budget surplus (BS), accumulation of 
debt held by the public (∆BP). 
 
(2) Accumulation of FER and economic growth. Overall there seems to be a positive 
relationship between the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the monetary authorities and 
the rates of long term economic growth. It is observed for different periods, and for different 
measures of FER - average for the period, as well as the increment for the period, as a proportion of 
GDP and in months of import (fig. 3.4). It is not observed however for developed countries (fig. 
3.5). But fast growing developing countries more often than not appear to have high and rapidly 
growing reserves. Which way the causation runs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.4. Average ratio of gross international reserves to GDP and average annual 
growth rates of GDP per capita in 1960-99, %,
R2 = 0,2396
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     It is difficult to argue that the successful growth leads to rapid accumulation of reserves because 
the accumulation of reserves is a policy variable. Monetary authorities theoretically can accumulate 
as much reserves as they like over the long run through buying foreign currency with domestic 
currency. Sterilization of the increases in money supply resulting from the reserve accumulation 
may be a difficult task in the presence of open capital account, but the facts are that countries with 
high reserves had better record of macroeconomic stability than the others. In any case, if successful 
growth is somehow accompanied by the rapid accumulation of FER, the appropriate question to ask 
is whether this reserve build up is a necessary pre-condition for growth, or whether this growth 
could continue without the reserve build up. 
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    We used standard growth regressions to show that the accumulation of reserves and policy-
induced accumulation of FER matters for economic growth even after other factors are taken into 
account. We control for initial level of development and for investment climate index (ranging from 
0 to 100; the higher it is, the better the climate), for investment/GDP ratios and population growth 
rates6.  Regression results (table 4 - for 1960-99 period and 4a - for 1975-99 period) show the link 
between investment/GDP ratios and growth, but also suggest that the accumulation of reserves 
creates stimuli for growth through greater involvement into foreign trade. Even after controlling for 
investment/GDP ratios, investment climate and population growth, it turns out that the goodness of 
fit improves once the level of reserves (or change in this level) or increase in export/trade or the 
underpricing of the exchange rate is added on the right hand side. This is to suggest that the 
accumulation of FER is associated with greater involvement into the international trade that in turn 
produces externalities - higher capital productivity. With equal investment/GDP ratios and 
population growth rates countries that accumulate FER at a faster pace exhibit higher growth rates 
of international trade as compared to GDP and higher growth of GDP itself. The results for 
developing countries only are very similar.  
                                                 
6 Although it obviously does not go automatically that higher investment result in the higher growth rate of output, 
although traditional Solow-type growth models predict that in the long term output growth rates cannot be influenced by 
higher investment, and although critics of the investment - growth nexus were recently quite vocal (see, for instance, 
Easterly, 2001), the positive link between investment and growth appears to be one of the most robust relationships that 
was established by the empirical research of economic growth (Kenny, Williams, 2000). In all growth regressions 
investment or the share of investment in GDP turn out to be highly statistically significant.  
 
 
 
Table 4. Factors explaining the average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1960-99 - cross 
country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable Average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1960-99 
Number of observations 59 75 75 75 75 56 
Average investment/GDP ratio in  
1960-99 
 0.14  
*** 
0.12 *** 0.13***  0.08 *** 
Log PPP GDP per capita in 1975 1.25 *** -1.2 *** -1.1 *** -1.2 *** -1.13 ** -.0002 ***
2000 investment climate index,  
ICRG, % 
 0.08 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.09 *** 0.06 *** 
Average population growth rate in  
1960-99 
 -0.2,Tst 
= -1.2 
-0.33* -0.3* -0.33 * -0.47 ** 
Increase in the ratio of FER to GDP 
1960 to 1999, p.p. 
0.032**      
Average growth rates of FER in  
1960-99 
     0.08* 
Average level of FER to GDP in  
1960-99, % 
  0.034  
*** 
   
Policy-determined average level of 
FER to GDP in 1960-99, % 
(calculated as the residual from the 
equation linking reserves to import)
   0.042 *** 0.05 ***  
Constant  -2.31 -2.4 -1.2 -1.1 0.05 -3.29 ** 
Adjusted R2 14 54 58 58 43 49 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
        In table 4, we use the indicator of policy determined level of reserves (calculated as the 
residual from the equation linking average FER/GDP ratio to import)7. It has stronger impact on 
growth than the actual level of reserves (coefficients are 0.042 and 0.034 respectively). Overall the 
growth promoting effect of FER accumulation is quite powerful: a country that keeps the FER to 
GDP ratio at a level 20 p.p. higher than the required level of reserves gains about 1 p.p. extra 
average annual growth of GDP per capita over the 40 year period. Or else, a country that raises it’s 
FER/GDP ratio by 1 p.p. a year over the course of 40 years may hope to increase the annual average 
growth rate of GDP per capita by 1.3 p.p. (40*0.032 = 1.3) The effect of reserve accumulation is 
noticeable allowing for cross-country differences in investment/GDP ratios and it becomes even 
stronger, if investment/GDP ratios are not included on the right hand side. This is to suggest that the 
                                                 
7 Later, for the 1975-79 period, we use the indicator of policy induced change in FER/GDP ratio, computed 
as a residual from (1). For the 1960-99 period, however, we use the policy-induced level of FER/GDP ratio 
because  there is not enough points for the change indicator.  
impact of reserve accumulation on growth is multidimensional - it raises investment/GDP ratios, 
and it also contributes to the increase in the productivity of this investment.  
 
Table 4a. Factors explaining the average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99 - cross 
country OLS regression results, robust estimates  
Dependent variable Average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99 
Number of observations 92 77 90 90 90 70 70 
Average population growth rate in  
1975-99, % 
-0.88 
 *** 
-0.68 
** 
-0.77 
*** 
-.086 
*** 
-0.76 
*** 
-1.22 
*** 
-0.93 
*** 
Log PPP GDP per capita in 1975, $US  -1.16* -1.44**   -1.15***  
1984-90 investment climate index,  
ICRG, % 
 0.06  
*** 
     
Average investment/GDP ratio in  
1975-99 
  0.12 
*** 
 0.11 
*** 
  
Annual average inflation in 1975-99, %   -0.01* -0.01 
** 
-0.01 
** 
-0.01** -0.01** 
Total population in 1999, million    3*10-09 
*** 
3*10-09
*** 
2*10-09 
** 
3*10-09 
** 
Population density in 1999, people per 
 1 sq. km 
   .0005 
*** 
.0003* .0007 
*** 
.0004 
*** 
Increase in the ratio of FER to GDP  
from 1975 to 1999, p.p. 
0.037
* 
0.05 
** 
0.040 
*** 
0.040 
** 
0.032 
* 
  
Increase in the ratio of FER to GDP,  
determined by objective factors –  
according to equation (1)  
      0.068** 
Policy-determined increase in the ratio 
of FER to GDP in 1975-99 - R∆ pol  
     0.10** 0.059* 
Interaction term = (Policy-determined in
the ratio of FER to GDP in 1975-99)*  
(Per capita PPP GDP in 1975, % of US
 level) 
     -0.0015
** 
 
Constant  2.8*** 2.9 0.11 2.65*** 0.2 7.3*** 3.0*** 
Adjusted R2 27 38 50 46 55 56 56 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 In table 4a we consider the 1975-99 period and use the indicators of actual accumulation of 
FER (as a % of GDP) and policy determined increase in the FER/GDP ratio over the period - as a 
residual from (1).  We also control for inflation because the policy of FER accumulation influences 
growth positively only if it does not lead to inflation, i.e. accumulation of reserves is accompanied 
by sterilization and does not lead to expansionary monetary policy. It turns out that the actual 
accumulation of reserves has a positive and significant impact on growth and that this relationship 
is quite robust to the inclusion of common sense control variables – population growth rates, total 
population and population density, initial level of GDP per capita and (sometimes) investment/GDP 
ratio.  
       Interestingly enough, both indicators of reserve accumulation – the one determined by objective 
circumstances according to (1), and the one determined by policy considerations (computed as a 
difference between actual increase in FER/GDP ratio and objectively determined increase) have a 
positive and significant impact on growth (table 4a, 6th column). The interpretation is quite 
transparent: high and low growth is usually associated with greater trade/GDP ratios and hence – 
greater FER/GDP ratios; but if accumulation of reserves proceeds at an even higher pace – in excess 
of objective needs, leading to the undervaluation of RER, this has a positive impact on growth.  
     The best equation explaining growth in 1975-99 without the investment variable (only with non-
policy variables, such as population, population density, initial level of GDP per capita in 1975, and 
population growth rates) and only with two policy variables – policy determined increase in 
FOREX/GDP ratio and inflation for the period is as follows (table 4a, 7th column): 
 
GROWTH = CONST. + CONTR. VAR. + R∆ pol (0.10 – 0.0015Ycap75us)   (2) 
R2 = 56, N=70, all variables are significant at 10% level or less, 
where Ycap75us – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level.  
 
It turns out that there is a threshold level of GDP per capita in 1975 – about 67% of the US level: 
countries below this level could stimulate growth via accumulation of FER in excess of objective 
needs, whereas for richer countries the impact of FER accumulation was negative. This is exactly in 
line with our explanation (see the section on theoretical model) – one of the most important effects 
of the accumulation of reserves is the undervaluation of the RER that encourages export and 
international trade in general and allows the country to reap the benefits of export externality. This 
externality, however, is the strongest for developing countries: developed countries have already 
achieved the optimal share of foreign trade in GDP, whereas in developing countries the share of 
foreign trade stays at sub-optimal level. If returns to the economy from exports are greater than the 
returns to particular firms, export would stay below the optimal level. One way to reach the optimal 
level of international trade and to reap the benefits of trade externalities is to accumulate foreign 
exchange reserves, which would lead to the underpricing of the exchange rate and greater exports 
and later – imports8. Below we try to show that countries with high reserve accumulation have 
lower real exchange rate, and that the latter is correlated with the increase in the share of external 
trade in GDP.  
     The following stylized facts point into the direction of the existence of the mechanism which can 
transform the accumulation of FER into higher economic growth. 
(3) Accumulation of FER and exchange rate undervaluation. The PPP exchange rate of the US$ in 
local currency, , is defined as the ratio of domestic prices, , to US prices, PPPe P
*P :  
*P
PePPP = , 
so the ratio of the PPP exchange rate to official exchange rate, , is equal to the ratio of domestic 
prices to the US prices converted into domestic currency at official exchange rate: 
ofe
 
ofof
PPP
eP
P
e
e
∗= *
 
     As was previously argued, there are a number of reasons why the actual (official) exchange rates 
in less developed countries are usually below the PPP levels. One of the reasons is associated with 
the policy of monetary authorities in accumulating the foreign exchange reserves. The faster the 
accumulation of reserves, the more undervalued is the exchange rate as compared to PPP, the lower 
are domestic prices as compared to prices of other countries (US prices in our case, since the 
exchange rate of the local currency is measured against $US). How important is this particular 
policy factor in comparison with other factors beyond the immediate control of the policymakers?  
    The data suggest that the impact of policies of monetary authorities on the exchange rate is by no 
means negligible: there is a negative relationship between the increase in FER and the exchange 
rate undervaluation as measured by the ratio of PPP exchange rate of local currency in US$ to the 
official exchange rate (fig. 3.6). On the other hand, the policy of reserve accumulation and 
undervaluation of domestic currency has its obvious costs – countries that pursue this kind of policy 
                                                 
8 In another paper (Polterovich, Popov, 2004) we apply this principle to other policies – tariff protectionism, regulation 
of FDI, migration, etc. The argument is that “good” policies vary depending on the level of technological development 
(GDP per capita) and the quality of institutions. At a low stage of development the country can stimulate growth by 
accumulating FER, by using protectionist instruments, and by controlling the inflow of FDI, whereas at a higher stage 
appear to experience some appreciation of real exchange rate, although even with this appreciation 
it remains lower than in countries with no reserve build up. Increase in the ratio of FER to GDP in 
1975-99 period is statistically significant in regression equations explaining the average ratio of 
domestic to foreign prices in this period (table 5). The goodness of fit improves if net external 
balance is taken into account – not every accumulation of reserves, but only the accumulation that 
occurs under the positive external balance (i.e. is not financed by foreign borrowing) can lead to the 
undervaluation of the exchange rate.  
 
Fig. 3.6. Increase in the ratio of gross foreign exchange reserves to GDP and the ratio 
of PPP to official exchange rate in 1975-99, %
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In 1975-99 the ratio of domestic to the US prices (i.e. the real exchange rate against the 
US$) for all developing countries, as a group, declined, whereas for rich countries it increased (fig. 
2.2). It has to do more with the terms of trade effect and the long cycle in resource prices (after 
peaking in 1980 the resource prices mostly declined or were low until 1999) than with Balassa-
Samuelson effect, which is not observable also because developing countries as a group were not 
catching up with rich countries in productivity levels in this period. It is noteworthy, however, that 
for the fastest growing developing countries (Botsawna, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Thailand), in which the Balassa-Samuelson effect should have been 
the strongest, the decrease in real exchange rate versus the US$ was no less pronounced than for all 
developing countries. This probably means that the accumulation of FER in the fastest growing 
                                                                                                                                                 
of development the growth conducive policies are exactly the opposite – liberalization of trade and capital flows, no 
developing countries completely outweighed the productivity growth effect, so the real exchange 
rate was declining as fast as in slowly growing economies.  
 
Table 5. Factors explaining the average ratio of domestic to US prices in 1975-99 – cross 
country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable = average ratio of domestic to US prices in 1975-99 
Number of observations 89 78 78 72 (dev.  only) 
PPP GDP per capita in 1975 .006***    
2000 investment climate index,  
ICRG, % 
 1.00*** 1.37***  
Increase in the ratio of FER to  
GDP from 1975 to 1999, p.p. 
-0.53** -.88*** -0.54* -.57*** 
Average ratio of trade to PPP  
GDP in 1980-99 
.35*** .39***  .41*** 
Average external balance in 1975- 
99, % of GDP 
  1.37***  
Net fuel imports, % of total imports    -.27*** 
Constant  33.8*** -17.3 162.7*** 39.7 
Adjusted R2 64 53 45 62 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
(4)  Relative prices and exchange rate undervaluation. It is usually assumed that prices for tradable 
goods do not differ much across countries and that the ratio of prices of non-tradables to tradables is 
one of the measures of real exchange rate. Theoretically, the FER accumulation should affect 
relative prices for non-tradables, whereas prices for tradables should more or less  the same across 
countries (the difference is due to trade barriers and transportation costs). To put it differently, 
international differences in price levels should be mostly determined by differences in prices for 
non-tradables. We tried to verify that by looking at relative prices of health care and education 
(non-tradables) as compared to prices of clothing and footwear (taken as a proxy for the tradable 
goods prices) 
    The problem is that health care and education are often non-tradables not only internationally, but 
within the country as well and are poor proxies for prices of all non-tradables, which include other 
important services, such as transportation, communications, housing and public utilities, trade and 
financial services for which comparable data are not available. Prices for health care and education 
are usually to a large extent controlled by the government and hence may not respond immediately 
to the change in relative prices caused by the accumulation of FER and undervaluation of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
accumulation of FER, etc.     
exchange rate. It is noteworthy nevertheless that countries with low relative prices for health care, 
education and energy exhibit higher investment/GDP ratios. Overall, it seems that some relative 
prices of intermediate goods may react to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (build up 
of reserves – devaluation – increase in prices for tradables – decline of relative prices of non-
tradables) and that lower prices for some these goods, even when not caused directly by the reserve 
accumulation, contribute to higher investment/GDP ratios and higher growth rates of output. 
     The correlation of prices for tradables with prices for non-tradables is very high and prices for 
these goods are strongly correlated with the level of development – GDP per capita (table 6, fig. 
2.1), which creates the false impression that there is no difference in the levels of prices for 
tradables and non-tradables (the lower is the GDP per capita, the lower are prices for tradables and 
non-tradables). In fact, it is easy to show that low price levels in developing countries are associated 
first and foremost with low prices for non-tradables (table 6). The accumulation of FER suppresses 
relative prices for non-tradables more than it lowers prices for tradables – in table 7 the coefficient 
of the FER increase variable in the equation explaining relative health care prices in not significant 
and the R2 in this equation is less than in the equation explaining relative prices for clothing and 
footwear.  
 
Table 6. Correlation coefficients between prices of tradadbles and non- tradables (55 
observations) 
 All domestic 
 to US prices, 
 1980-99 
Domestic prices 
of clothing to US 
 prices  
Domestic prices 
of healthcare to  
US prices 
1975 PPP 
capita 
All domestic to US prices, 1980-99 1    
Domestic prices of clothing to US  
prices  
0.6681 1   
Domestic prices of healthcare to US 
prices 
0.7061 0.8392 1  
1975 PPP GDP per capita 0.7009   0.8365  0.8946 1 
 
Table 7. Factors explaining 1993 price levels of health care and education, clothing and 
footwear 
Dependent variable Ratio of pr
health care to 
clothing 
Ratio of pr
education to p
clothing 
Ratio of 
health care pric
prices  
Ratio of 
clothing and 
prices to the U
Number of observations 77 77 58 58 
PPP GDP per capita in 1999 .000647* .0008086* 0.0033*** 0.0032*** 
Average ratio of domestic to  
US prices in 1975-99 
0.26** 0.28**   
Increase FER/GDP ratio in  
1980-99 
  -0.33** -0.32 (T stat=-
Constant  38.93*** 34.57*** 17.95*** 41.52*** 
Adjusted R2 23 23 78 64 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
   
   (5)   Accumulation of FER and investment/GDP ratios. If accumulation of reserves leads to 
devaluation and results in higher relative prices of tradables (as compared to wages and prices of 
non-tradables) and higher profits, it is reasonable to expect that this would result in higher savings 
and investment/GDP ratios. But on the other hand, not every devaluation of national currency 
should be expected to produce higher investment, but only devaluation caused by the active policy 
of reserve accumulation: if the exchange rate of the national currency is low (falling) due to the 
outflow of capital caused by, say, poor investment climate as a result of political uncertainty (war), 
it would only cause the transformation of limited domestic savings into the capital flight at the 
expense of investment. Hence, the link between investment and accumulation of FER should be 
stronger than the link between investment and the undevaluation of currency, which actually seems 
to be the case. The link between the FER accumulation and the share of investment in GDP appears 
to be quite strong even without controlling for other factors (fig. 3.7). 
 Fig. 3.7. Increase in the ratio of gross international reserves to GDP, p.p., and average 
ratio of gross capital investment to GDP in 1960-99, %, for ... countries
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     The results of regression of the average share of investment in GDP on the ICRG index of 
investment climate, and the increase in foreign exchange reserves for the periods of 1960-99 and 
1975-99 are reported in table 8 and 8a. Investment climate index (ranging from 0 to 100; the higher 
it is, the better the climate) is strongly correlated with GDP per capita, so in many cases they act as 
substitutes, GDP per capita being just another proxy for investment climate.  Both – FER required 
level and FER policy-induced level have a significant impact on the ratio of investment to GDP. 
The same goes for the impact of required change in FER and policy-induced change in FER for the 
period 1975-99. The link for required level and change in FER and investment/GDP ratio could be 
explained by the fact that required reserves depend on imports, whereas investment/GDP ratios are 
strongly correlated with trade/GDP ratios (fig. 3.8), and hence greater FER go hand in hand with 
larger international trade and higher investment (the causation probably runs both ways).  
 
Fig. 3.8.  Investment/GDP ratio and average ratio of foreign trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99
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 To take into account all factors that suppress prices for non-tradables as compared to prices 
in developed countries (US), we control for the ratio of healthcare prices to clothing prices (as 
compared to the US. This variable has a predictable negative sign – the lower are prices for non-
tradables, the higher are profits, exports and investment of the tradable goods sector. To put it 
differently, accumulation of FER is not the only way of underpricing non-tradables and driving the 
country into export-oriented growth; similar results could be reached by taxation, price controls, 
and other policy instruments, but these latter policy instruments are more selective and hence 
corruption-prone.  
 
Table 8. Factors explaining the average share of investment in GDP in 1960-99 – cross 
country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable = average share of investment in GDP in 1960-99 
Number of observations 59 58 109 34 34 57 57 58 57 40 (dev
 only) 
39 (dev
 only) 
Log PPP GDP per capita in  
1975 
4.61**  3.71** 4.97**  5.24 
*** 
4.15**     
Increase in the ratio of FER to  
GDP from 1960 to 1999, p.p. 
0.15** 0.13 
*** 
 0.14** 0.10*   0.11 
** 
0.09* 0.11 
* 
0.10(Ts
=1.6) 
Required average level of FER 
in 1960-99,% 
  0.33**         
Policy-determined  average  
level of FER in 1960-99, % 
  0.09*         
Investment climate index,  
ICRG, % 
 0.14 
*** 
  0.19 
** 
  0.22 
*** 
0.22 
*** 
0.19 
** 
0.18* 
Ratio of prices for healthcare 
 to prices for clothing in 1993 
   -0.03 -0.05
*** 
-0.05 
** 
     
Ratio of prices for education 
 to prices for clothing in 1993 
      -0.05     
Average external balance in  
1960-99, % of GDP 
       -0.24 
* 
-0.23
* 
-0.27 
* 
-0.26 
* 
Net fuel imports in 1960-99,  
% of total imports 
       -0.09 
*** 
-0.09
*** 
-0.10 
*** 
-0.11 
*** 
Interaction term = (increase in 
reserves)x(foreign/domestic  
prices)x (external balance) 
        0.01, T  0.02 
(Tst. 
=0.9) 
Constant  5.02 11.7** 6.7* 8.73 13.0** 9.2** 9.8 
** 
29.4 5.6 7.2 7.8 
Adjusted R2 21 21 25 21 25 18 11 35 30 39 35 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
     We also control for foreign financing of investment - positive external balance means that the net 
foreign financing of domestic investment is negative and consequently investment/GDP ratios are 
lower. This effect of negative foreign financing on investment appears to be stronger than the effect 
of positive current account leading to the accumulation of reserves and to the undervaluation of 
domestic currency (the impact of reserve accumulation on the ratio of domestic to foreign prices is 
the strongest, when reserve accumulation is not financed by the inflow of foreign capital – see table 
5).  The latter effect, however, is captured by the interaction term in table 6: the increase in reserves 
together with the current account surplus and higher ratio of foreign to domestic prices leads to 
higher investment/GDP ratios, although the T-statistics of this interaction term is low, when its 
components are included into regression equation as separate variables. The results for developing 
countries only (excluding 24 countries that were first members of OECD) are very similar and 
coefficients of FER accumulation variable are even a bit higher. The results for the 1975-99 period 
(table 8a) are very similar as well.  
 
Table 8a. Factors explaining the average share of investment in GDP in 1975-99 – cross 
country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable = average share of investment in GDP in 1975-99 
Number of observations 79 79 79 72 59 (dev. 
only) 
85 46 46 48 42 
Log PPP GDP per capita  
In 1975 
    -.0008 
** 
     
2000 investment  
climate index, ICRG, % 
0.17 
*** 
0.17 
*** 
0.21 
*** 
 0.27 
*** 
0.15 
*** 
0.23 
*** 
0.26 
*** 
0.24 
*** 
 
1984-90 investment  
climate index, ICRG, % 
   0.14 
*** 
     0.14 
*** 
Increase in the ratio of 
FER to GDP from 1975 
 To 1999, p.p. 
0.15 
*** 
0.24 
*** 
0.22 
*** 
 0.23 
*** 
 0.19 
*** 
0.26 
*** 
  
Policy-determined in- 
Crease in the ratio of 
FER to GDP from 1975 
 To 1999, p.p. 
   0.28 
*** 
     0.22 
*** 
Ratio of prices for health- 
Care to prices for clothing
 In 1993 
      -0.06 
*** 
-0.07 
*** 
-0.08
*** 
-0.08
*** 
Average external balance 
In 1960-99, % of GDP 
  -0.21
*** 
-0.20 
** 
      
Net fuel imports in 1960- 
99, % of total imports 
 -0.09
*** 
-0.12
*** 
-0.09 
*** 
-0.12 
*** 
-0.06 
*** 
 -0.15 
*** 
-0.13
*** 
-0.11
*** 
Interaction term =  
(increase  in reserves) x 
(foreign/domestic prices)x
(external balance) 
     0.03*   0.03 
* 
 
Constant  10.3 
*** 
9.5 
*** 
6.3 
** 
33.8 
*** 
4.63 11.3 
*** 
10.7 
*** 
9.6 
*** 
11.5 
*** 
20.2 
*** 
Adjusted R2 17 34 39 37 42 16 37 63 44 55 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
It is worth noting that savings rate increases with the accumulation of reserves as well, but 
the correlation is weaker than that with investment. The interpretation could be as follows. The FER 
build up leads to the undervaluation of the exchange rate, increase in prices of tradadbles in local 
currency and increase in profits (business savings) because wages and prices for non-tradables lag 
behind the growth of prices of tradable goods. However, the increase in business savings may be 
offset by the drop in personal savings since real incomes fall (increases in personal income lag 
behind the increases in prices) and the households in difficult times try to maintain their 
consumption at the expense of savings. If total private savings remain unchanged (the increase in 
business savings is exactly matched by the decline in personal savings), there may be an increase in 
investment due to the inflow of foreign capital (attracted by higher profitability) and due to the 
decline in government budget deficit resulting from increased revenues (due to price increases) and 
lagging increases in expenditure (for transfers, wages and salaries and purchases of non-tradables).  
      The good control variable is population density, it improves the goodness of fit in virtually all 
equations. For instance, if included into 4th equation in table 8a, it increases R2 to 46%, whereas in 
the last  regression in table 8a, it increases R2 to 64%.  
 
    (6) Accumulation of FER, undervaluation of currency, trade and investment. Accumulation of 
reserves boosts not only investment/GDP ratios, but also the share of exports and trade in GDP. 
Trade/GDP ratios are positively related to the accumulation of reserves and negatively to the ratio 
of domestic to US prices.  
Fig. 3.8 suggests that increases in investment and foreign trade go hand in hand. To put it 
differently, increases in investment and output are linked to the growth of exports and output in the 
tradable goods sector This is probably the major advantage of the strategy of reserve accumulation: 
it ensures not only rapid increases in investment, but also high returns to investment, high capital 
productivity due to increasing involvement into international trade. During export-led growth 
benefits emerge partly because investment projects are for the expansion of exports and hence their 
competitiveness is constantly tested by the world market, partly from greater specialization and 
externalities from international trade. 
     External trade/GDP ratios depend on the level of development (GDP per capita) and on a 
country size –smaller countries are more engaged in the international trade and the share of trade in 
GDP of these countries grows faster. As table 3.9 suggests, the ratio of trade to GDP and the 
increase in this ratio, after controlling for the size of the country (GDP), the level of development 
(GDP per capita) and the abundance of resources (share of net fuel imports in total imports or terms 
of trade change) is correlated with the increase in FER, with the undervaluation of the exchange rate 
(the ratio of domestic to foreign prices) and with lower levels of prices of non-tradadbles as 
compared to tradables. 
 
 Table 3.9. Factors explaining the share of export and foreign trade in GDP in 1960-99 
– cross country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable Increase in the ratio
of export to GDP in 
1960-99 
Average ratio 
of trade to  
PPP GDP  
in 1980-99 
Increase in the ratio 
to PPP GDP 
 in 1980-99, p.p. 
Number of observations 59 47 30 94 62 86 93 81 
Log PPP GDP per capita 
in 1975 
15.59
*** 
      26.7 
*** 
PPP GDP per capita in  
1975 
   0.0085
*** 
  0.007 
*** 
 
PPP GDP per capita in  
1999 
    .003 
*** 
   
2000 investment  
climate index, ICRG 
  0.76 
* 
     
Average ratio of export  
to GDP in 1960-99 
 0.77 
*** 
0.71 
*** 
     
Average ratio of trade to 
PPP GDP in 1960-99,% 
       -0.19
*** 
Terms of trade improve- 
ment index, 1960-99 
 -0.23
*** 
      
Net fuel imports in 1960- 
99, % of total imports 
  0.39 
*** 
 -.31** 0.53
*** 
 0.40 
*** 
Increase in the ratio of  
FER to GDP from 1960 to 
1999, p.p. 
1.06 
*** 
0.37 
(Tst=
1.6) 
0.56 
* 
     
Average ratio of domestic  
to US prices in 1980-99, %
      -0.49 
*** 
-0.18
** 
Increase in the ratio of  
FER to GDP from 1960 to 
1980 , p.p. 
    1.79 
*** 
   
Increase in the ratio of  
FER to GDP from 1980 to 
1999, p.p. 
   0.7 
8*** 
1.44 
*** 
0.58
*** 
 0.74 
*** 
PPP GDP in 1999, bill.$ -.004*   -0.009 
*** 
-.009
** 
   
Average annual FDI net  
inflow in 1980-99, % of  
GDP 
  4.9 
** 
     
Constant  -25.57 12.3 -67.9 -15.40 .87 8.9 3.82 -80 
** *** *** *** 
Adjusted R2 41 38 61 21 49 29 19 57 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
   (7) Foreign direct investment and FER accumulation. It appears that the inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) depends on the accumulation of FER in the preceding period and in the current 
period. Fig. 3.9 tells the story – there is a surprisingly strong correlation between the increase in 
FER in 1960-99 and the net inflow of FDI in the 1980s and the1990s. The FER build up 
underprices the exchange rate and thus makes domestic assets look cheap in foreign currencies. 
Even more important is probably the demonstration effect – the ability of authorities to accumulate 
reserves for a considerable period of time is taken as a sign of the government credibility and 
consistency of its policy. China in recent 25 years may be a case in point – the inflow of FDI was 
miniscule for the whole period of the 1980s, although the openness policy was enacted from the 
very start of reforms (1979) and although the growth rates in the 1980s were close to 10% a year. 
Only in the 1990s foreign direct investment poured into China.   
Fig. 3.9. Increase in the ratio of FOREX to GDP in 1960-99 and average net inflows of FDI 
as a % of GDP in 1980-99
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   As regressions reported in table 10 show, the inflow of FDI in 1980-99 is not correlated with the 
investment climate index, but is strongly correlated with build up of FER in the preceding period 
(1960-80) and current period (1980-99). As a matter of fact, the impact of the preceding period is 
stronger than that of the current period – the coefficients are higher and the T-statistics is better.  
 
Table 10. Factors explaining the net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
 1980-99 – cross country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable Average annual net inflow of FDI in 1980-99, % o
Number of observations 59 40 47 40 39 37 36 
PPP GDP per capita in 
1975 
    -.0001 
* 
 -.0004 
*** 
2000 investment 
climate index, ICRG 
  -0.1   -0.02
 
0.05* 
Average ratio of FER 
to GDP in1960-99, % 
0.05
*** 
      
Increase in the ratio of 
FER to GDP from 1960 
to 1999, p.p. 
 0.08
***
   0.08 
*** 
 
Increase in the ratio of 
FER to GDP from 1960 
to 1980, p.p. 
   0.1 
*** 
0.09 
*** 
 0.09 
*** 
Increase in the ratio of 
FER to GDP from 1980 
to 1999, p.p. 
   0.07 
*** 
0.06 
*** 
  
Increase in the ratio of 
FER to import from 1980 
to 1999, p.p. 
      0.1,  
Tst.= 
1.6 
Constant 0.4 0.4* 1.7 0.26 0.8** 1.7  
Adjusted R2 18 50 -2 50 53 51 52 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
(8) FER accumulation and stages of economic growth. The analysis of the effect of FER 
accumulation on growth is complicated by the fact that that there are three (and possibly more) 
mechanisms that we identified so far, and that these mechanism may operate in different countries 
at different periods, so cross-country regressions should be supplemented with the analysis of panel 
data and time series for particular, especially rapidly growing, countries. We were able to make 
only initials steps in distinguishing stages of growth and mechanisms that operate at each stage. The 
results are very preliminary.  
   We identified all countries that were increasing GDP per capita by more than 3% annually in 
1975-99 and the year of “take off” for every country defined as the year when these countries 
increased their long term growth rate (measured by the 5-year moving average of GDP per capita 
growth) by at least 2 p.p. After excluding Cyprus, Ireland and Luxembourg as developed countries 
and  Hong Kong – because its take-off point was in the 1950s (no comparable statistics) there 
remained 12 countries on the list: Botswana that “took off” in 1966, Chile (1976), China (1976), 
Egypt (1974), India (1982), Indonesia (1967), Korea (1965), Malaysia (1971), Mauritius (1968), 
Singapore (1964), Sri Lanka (1974) and  Thailand (1986). The trajectories of FER/GDP ratios, 
growth rates of GDP per capita, external balance and net FDI inflows as a % of GDP are presented 
at fig. 3.10. 
 
Fig. 3.10. Reserves/GDP ratios and GDP per capita growth rates for 12 fastest 
developing economies in 1975-99, unweighted average, % ("0" is the year of take-off)
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   It appears that reserve accumulation preceded the period of take-off at least by 5 years and 
continued during the take-off stage. After 10 years of rapid reserve accumulation, when the 
FER/GDP ratio increased from 5 to 15%, there was a pause of about 10 years long (which probably 
resulted in the slow down of economic growth from the year 7 to the year 15), whereas after that the 
FER accumulation accelerated again.  
   The real exchange rate for these countries depreciated slightly before the take off and more 
substantially – after the take off, but after 10 years showed signs of stabilization (fig. 3.11). Trade 
balance improved around the take-off date, but deteriorated afterwards, as the net inflow of FDI and 
other capital increased (fig. 3.12). The external balance (export minus import of non-factor services) 
was strongly negative and did not show signs of improvement until 10 years after the take-off. The 
inflow of FDI increased shortly after the take-off and continued to increase afterwards.  
 
Fig. 3. 11. Average real exchange rate versus the US $ (Year 12 = 100%)  in fast growing 
developing economies, year "0" denotes the point of take-off
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    The crucial question is whether the net inflow of FDI was larger than the increase in FER. For the 
period of 1980-99 it actually was larger for Chile, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, but was smaller than the FDI inflow for Botswana and Korea. If it is assumed that all FDI 
inflows were associated with the build up of FER (which is clearly an exaggeration), then it turns 
out that for the first group of countries the accumulation of FER resulted in a completely 
counterweighing inflow of FDI, which on balance pushed the exchange rate upwards, not down.  
   
Fig. 3. 12. Average real exchange rate versus the US $ (Year 12 = 100%), trade balance and 
net inflow of FDI as a % of GDP in 12 fast growing developing economies, year "0" 
denotes the point of take-off
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   Whereas the story is different for various countries and various periods, it appears that in at least 
some countries in the second decade after the take off, the inflow of FDI outweighed totally the 
downward pressure on the exchange rate due to the FER accumulation. In this period the export 
externality mechanism associated with the undervaluation of the exchange rate was turned off 
completely and replaced by another one –   by the investment inflow mechanism associated with the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate. The model in the next section examines these two mechanisms 
formally. 
 
4. Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves: a model 
     Why do countries accumulate foreign exchange reserves (FER)? It is a surprise that only a few 
researches are devoted to this question and that a related theory does not seem to be well developed. 
One may argue that FER are necessary to pay debt, to support a chosen exchange rate regime, to 
smoothen foreign exchange operation, and to prevent an attack against domestic currency. Another 
possible explanation refers to the portfolio argument: FER are a part of a country portfolio 
investment that earns world market interest rate. Our statistical analysis seems to reveal that these 
explanations are incomplete since the speed of FER accumulation is a policy variable that may be 
used to accelerate economic growth. In this section we suggest a combination of a Sidrauski-type 
model and an AK-type model of endogenous economic growth to study FER accumulation policies. 
It will be shown that, under reasonable conditions, FER accumulation may influence real exchange 
rate. Two hypotheses on mechanisms of this influence are considered. The first one assumes that 
the accumulation policy forces a country to follow an unbalanced regime keeping positive current 
account at a steady state.  
    At the first glance, there is no any sense to choose this regime since it results in pure losses. Why 
do not spend the reserves to increase consumption? We show, however, that the FER accumulation 
brings real exchange rate down.  Therefore, this policy facilitates export development and helps to 
defend domestic producers. If the export sector dominates in the knowledge accumulation, then, in 
accordance to the logic of AK-models, the FER accumulation accelerates growth. Moreover, under 
some more restrictive conditions, it may also increase discounted utility value even if the 
accumulated reserves do not earn any interest and can not be used in the future.  The essence of this 
effect is, of course, strong positive export externality.  
   There are several objections against this hypothesis. One can think that reserve accumulation 
leads to inflation. This is not necessarily the case, however, if the rate of reserve accumulation does 
not exceed the rate of economic growth. Moreover, small inflation is not necessarily harmful, 
particularly for a developing economy9. In what follows we disregard its influence assuming money 
superneutrality.  
    The unbalanced regime is associated with direct losses of resources10. Clearly, waste of resources 
is not a first best solution. If the government is strong enough it can tax consumers and subsidize 
exporters to extract the potential gain from the externality. However, subsidizing activity may be 
costly since it entails rent seeking. The costs are rather large for developing country where 
inclination to rent seeking is particularly strong.  
   Therefore reserves accumulation may be considered as a second best policy. However, if a 
government pursues a direct export promoting policy then the stimulating role of the FER 
accumulation turns out to be questionable.  
  Another objection might stress the fact that import may have strong externality as well. In this case 
exchange rate undervaluation would not be reasonable. Some studies seem to show that export 
oriented policy is growth promoting. This may be interpreted as evidence that export externalities is 
                                                 
9 This is a conclusion of a number of empirical works ( Lucas ( ), Bruno and Easterly (1995)). It is also a 
conclusion of the authors who consider the optimal taxation problem including inflation tax (Felps (1993), 
Braun (1994), Movshovich (1998)). 
stronger in the most developing countries than import ones. It is quite plausible however that the 
undervaluation policy is not efficient for import dependent countries.  
   If domestic production substantially influences knowledge accumulation then the mechanism 
described above does not work. For this case FER accumulation can play a different role: it serves 
as a signal for foreign investors that the economy is in a good state.   
   In accordance with our second hypothesis, the speed of foreign investment is proportional to the 
speed of the FER accumulation. We assume also that the foreigners use domestic intermediators 
and earn world market interest rate that is smaller than domestic one. Under these conditions, FER 
accumulation results in pure capital inflow and brings real exchange rate up. This accelerates 
growth if domestic production externality is strong enough so that export sector has no knowledge 
accumulation advantage.     
    The first hypothesis seems to be more plausible for earlier stages of fast development, and the 
second one fits better the later stages when a country is better integrated into the world market.  
Note that for the third stage, when an economy is open, and domestic capital market is well 
developed, FER loose their role as an instrument of the economic growth acceleration.     
    The model has some specific features that seem to be reasonable to postulate for a developing 
economy. The economy is small and is open for good flows. Concerning capital flows, we consider 
two versions of the model. In the first one foreign capital is not permitted at all. In the second 
version, foreigners may purchase assets through domestic intermediators. The intermediators pay 
them world market interest rate that is less than domestic one. These are foreigners who take the 
decisions on the investment volumes dependently on the speed of reserve accumulation. 
Indebtedness issues are ignored, and, in both versions, the domestic forces form the domestic 
interest rate. Under such conditions the learning-by-doing capital externality can influence 
economic growth as it does in Romer-type models (Romer(1996)).  
  We assume also that export sale requires much greater capital expenditure than import purchase. 
This asymmetry seems to be plausible for a developing country where producers and traders have 
so much to learn about how to sell the domestic product. Thus export trade sector is introduced. 
This sector uses capital to convert a quantity of “nontradable” consumption good into the same 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 The losses may be not so large if one takes into account that the reserves earn world market interest rate 
and may be used in the future. 
quantity of the good marketed abroad.11 There are two interpretations of the trade sector activity. 
First, it may be considered as building marketing infrastructure: creating brands, making 
connections, and building capacities for selling goods abroad. Under this interpretation, one could 
count the consumption good as tradable one; the model reflects the fact that domestic and world 
prices of tradables are very different for many developing countries. Second, the activity may be 
considered as re-shaping of nontradables into tradables. Additional quantities require increasing 
increments of capital so that one could talk about a spectrum of goods with different degrees of 
tradability.  
   The import trade is costless, so that the price of the imported good coincides with the world price. 
The model includes also a representative consumer and two production sectors (fig. 4.1).  
The first sector produces a consumption good, and the second one produces an investment good that 
can be also imported.  Its dollar price is taken for 1. 
   The representative consumer maximizes overall utility function  
=Φ mах                                     (1) ∫∞ −+o t dtemvcu ρ))()((
subject to the budget constraint 
 
pTbrrpcrapmdtpdmdtda +−+Π+−=++ )(// 1π ,                                  (2) 
 
where  is an additive momentary utility function,  is consumption, is real money 
holding,  
)()( mvcu + c m
0>ρ  is a constant rate of time preference, a is the quantity of real assets,  Π  is the 
production  profit,  is a price of the consumption good, p π is inflation rate, is a volume of assets 
held by foreigners, T is a money transfer,  are, relatively,  domestic and world market interest 
rates. The term (  is intermediators’ profit
b
1, rr
brr )1− 12. All prices and real money are calculated in 
dollars. Real money and money transfers are measured in units of consumption. Note that the 
choice of p  is equivalent to the choice of real exchange rate.  
                                                 
11 Probably one can use a more standard model with composition of tradable and non-tradable goods (see , 
for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996 )). The model should be modified properly to allow for 
endogenous growth. This approach does not seem to be simpler. Our model contains three sectors instead 
of two and one consumption good instead of two in the standard models with nontradables.  
12 The average real interest rate in all countries in 1975-99 was 4.7%, in the 13 fastest developing 
economies – 5.4, in the United States – 5.1%, in the UK –2.2%, in Japan – 3.5%. For 1960-99: US – 4.0%, 
UK – 2.5%, Japan – 1.6%. 
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For simplicity and following a tradition, we take labor force in each sector as a constant13, and 
assume that the “consumption part” of the momentary utility function is given by 
)1/()( 1 θθ −= −ccu ,                                        (3) 
 
where θ >0, θ  ≠ 1. As usual, the No-Ponzi-Game –Condition is supposed to be valid. 
The profit Π  is a sum of three terms 
Π= Π 1 +Π 2 +Π 3 ,                          (4) 
 
where - is the profit of the Sector i. For simplicity we assume that all sectors have Cobb-
Douglas production functions that differs only by productivity multipliers, 
Π i
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Here  is capital accumulated in the sector i, and ik K  is the knowledge accumulated in the 
process of learning by doing. It is assumed that 
 
ii kK βΣ=  .    (6) 
The profit of Producer  is derived from maximization of the profit     i
)),((max iiii rkKkFb −=Π , (7) 
where , q is a fixed price of the exported good.  332211 )(,, ApqbpAbAb −===
The following balance conditions are supposed to be valid. 
1
3
1
/ YdtdkI i
i
−=Σ= .            (8) 
c = Y2 -  Y3 .                        (9) 
    
RrdtdRbrdtdbqYI 113 // +−−+= .                                  (10) 
 
                                                 
13 The model may be developed to include labor allocation among sectors. It does not change our 
conclusions.  
 Here R are accumulated reserves. The quantities b , , and   are supposed to be 
chosen by foreigners and the Central Bank, respectively.  
dtdb / ,R dtdR /
 
Asset market has to be balanced as well: 
  kba =+ = ,                 (11) i
i
kΣ=
3
1
where  denotes total capital in the economy.   Let  be total initial capital. The following initial 
condition is postulated.            
k 0k
 )0(0 kk = .                          (12) 
   It seems to be more natural to suppose that initial capital is fixed for each sector. In this setting, 
however, the study of the model would be much more complicated. 
   An equilibrium trajectory is defined as a set of functions, πλ ,,,,,,,,,,, mrpIKkkYac ii , that meets 
maximization and balance requirements (1)-(11) and initial condition (12).  
      It follows from the equilibrium conditions above and the budget constraint (2) that the money 
inflow in real terms is determined by the equation 
pTRrdtdRpmdtpdm +−=+ 1// π .                 (13) 
  Since the momentary utility is additive, the first order conditions for the real part of our economy 
and, therefore, the real trajectory itself are independent on the monetary variables, and m π 14. It 
drastically simplifies our analysis.   
    Keep in mind that, in the described setting, the price of consumption  represents real exchange 
rate.  
p
    The described three-sector model inherits a very useful property of a standard one sector AK 
model: it has no transitional dynamics.   
   To show this, suppose that the price of consumption is constant over time.  Then maximum 
principle for the consumer problem (1)- (3) leads to a well known expression for the rate of 
economic growth, 
p
λ , 
 
ρθλ −= r .                      (14) 
 
                                                 
14 This is well known property of superneutrality. It looks not very restrictive for the long  term analysis. 
It is convenient to introduce the notations 
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The following equalities are straightforward consequences of the relations (6), (16), (17)  and  first 
order conditions.  
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αα −== 1)( hprr ,                     (18) 
 
Khdk ii =                          (19) 
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If is constant then rate of return, p r , is constant as well. In view of (14), the economy develops 
with a constant rate of growth. From the balance equality (8) one gets 
1YkI −= λ .                                                 (21) 
Using (10) one has an equation 
1Yk −λ = RrdtdRbrdtdbqY 113 // +−−+ .        (22) 
 
 
Assume that  grow with the rate Rb, λ . Since , one has from (20) and (22): tekk λ0=
0
1
110 DkhdAk
ααλ −− = + 0133 DkhdqA αα − ))(( 100 rRb −− λ .        (23) 
  This is an equation with respect to . We assume that it has an appropriate solution, and will 
demonstrate that under some conditions, this is really the case.
p
15  If is a root of  (23), then all real 
variables are defined by formulas  (14)-(21), (9).  Rate of return,
p
r , and rate of growth,λ , are 
constants, initial values of capital variables, K , , and outputs, , are calculated from (17), (19), 
and (20). Initial values of import,
ik iY
I , and consumption, , are defined by (21) and (9). All the 
quantities grow with the same rate, 
c
λ . 
  Note, that money transfer T may be chosen by such a way that real money, , grow with the rate m
λ as well, whereas inflation rate, π , is equal to zero (see (13)).  
  We say that the economy follows a FER accumulation or unbalanced trajectory if 0/ ≠dtdR . In 
this case trade balance  may be positive or negative. If  the trajectory is called 
balanced one.  
IqY −3 IqY =3
 The integral (1) exists if the inequality  
                                        r<λ      (24) 
holds16, or equivalently,  
                                r)1( θρ −>     (25) 
In what follows we compare balanced and unbalanced trajectories by the value 
=Φ                                       ∫∞ −o t dtecu ρ)(
along the trajectory considered. 
   Denote by  an initial consumption that is defined by  (9).   Then the integral utility (24) is equal 
to 
0c
 
))(1/(10 λθθ −−=Φ − rc                                        (26) 
 
for both FER accumulation and balanced trajectories. It is simple to check that 
][ 3322
1
320
ααα dAdADhYYc −=−= −  .  (27) 
                                                 
15 We postulate that the investment good is imported and the consumption good is exported. This can not be 
the case under arbitrary parameters of the model. 
16 The average annual growth rate of GDP per capita in 13 fastest developing economies in 1975-99 was 
4.6%, whereas the real interest rate – 5.4%. The “world” real interest rate in this period was probably 3-4% 
(US – 5.1, UK – 2.2, Japan – 3.5%), so the inequality 1rr >> λ   most probably holds in reality. 
 
Obviously,  has to be positive, and, in view of our assumptions, import,0c I , has to be positive as 
well. Thus a solution, , of the equation (23) defines an equilibrium trajectory if and only if it 
meets (25) and the following additional requirement 
p
αα
3322 dAdA ≥ .   (28) 
It is equivalent to the inequality 
pq <ζ ,                    (29) 
 where  += 1/1 ζ  .   α/132 )/( AA
   
  Let introduce a concept of an autarkic trajectory. It is a trajectory of the economic system where 
export trade sector does not exist. Formally, one has to substitute zero for  in the formulas above 
to have an autarkic trajectory. A balanced trajectory may be autarkic if   the term of trade, , is not 
favorable enough so that foreign trade does not occur. 
3Y
q
   It follows from the above consideration that reserve accumulation may influence real exchange 
rate and, therefore, long run growth. Below, we consider two hypotheses on the influence 
mechanism. The consideration uses the fact that, if real exchange rate, r , increases then  the rate of 
growth, λ , may go up or down dependently on the knowledge accumulation coefficients iβ . 
Indeed, from (14) one has  
                     .   (30) ][)(' 333222
αα ββσ dAdAph −=
Therefore the following statement is a straightforward consequence of   (16), (18), and (29). 
  Proposition 1. The function  as well as  and )( ph )( pr )( pλ reach their minimum at  
*ζqp = ,  where  */1 ζ = 1+ .   (31) ααββ /132/1132 )/()/( AA+−
If 02 =β  then rate of growth and rate of return both are decreasing functions of the real exchange 
rate. If 32 ββ ≥  then  and )( pr )( pλ increase with respect to in the feasible aria. p
         The basic equation (23) may be written as     
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   where = .   A trajectory is balanced if ∆ θλ 10100 ))(( −−− krRb ∆ = 0. A balanced trajectory is 
autarkic if . Denote by  the left hand side of (32).  03 =d )( pΨ
The function is decreasing since )( pD
)()( 3322
2 αασ dAdADpD −−=′ (33) 
and in view of (28). 
 
4a. Positive trade balance hypothesis  
Assume that foreign investments are absent. For simplicity, we assume also 01 =r . Then 
= = . For a balanced trajectory ∆ dtdRk /10 θ−− θλ 100 −− kR ∆ =0 and trade balance is zero. At a FER 
accumulation trajectory, positive trade balance IqY −3  are accumulated by the Central Bank and 
never used.     The model generates an unbalanced trajectory if a real exchange rate, , meets the 
inequality   
p
13 YkqY −> λ .               
Usually a continuum of unbalanced trajectories exists. It was shown above that the real exchange 
rate is directly connected with the speed of FER accumulation = .  In framework of 
our model, FER grow with the rate 
dtdR / IqY −3
λ , and the speed is defined by initial value . dtdR / 0R
   Assume also that 02 =β  so that the production of the consumption good, Sector 2, does not 
contribute to the exchange rate. Then autarkic real exchange rate, , has to be found from the 
equation  
ap
−αβ α [11 A   ,       (34) ρθ σσσσ =+ − ])( 1211 ApAA
(see(32)) .The following proposition immediately follows from (34) and (25).             
  Proposition 2.  Let 02 =β . An autarkic trajectory exists if and only if the following inequalities 
are valid: 
01
1
1 >−> − Aαβρααθ .   (35) 
 
An autarkic trajectory is unique under these conditions.  
 
  
    If 02 =β , then decreases with respect to , and therefore )( ph p λ,r  are decreasing functions of 
 (see ((18),(14)). Thus, one gets the following important conclusion. p
  Proposition 3. Let  be an autarkic price, and the influence of consumption good sector,ap 2β , on 
the knowledge stock, K , be small enough. There exists such that for each q from the interval  
< <  a small FER accumulation increases rate of economic growth. This is reached by a small 
real exchange rate undervaluation.  
_
q ap
q
_
q
        To prove the proposition, consider )( pΨ , the left hand side of the basic equation (32), under 
2β =0 and . In view of  (15a), (30), and (33), the derivative  is strictly positive. The 
same is true under
apq = )(' apΨ
2β  small enough and for  closed enough to . Thus exists.  q ap
_
q
   Let  < < , and consider the equation (32), ap q
_
q )( pΨ = ∆+ρ , where  is a small quantity. Since 
 is increasing, the solution, 
∆
)( pΨ )(∆p , is an increasing function of ∆ . FER accumulation means 
that . Hence, FER accumulation decreases 0<∆ )(∆p in comparison to the balanced trajectory, 
and, in view of Proposition 1, increases rate of growth. 
    An increase of the growth rate may be accompanied by a decrease of initial consumption, , so 
that the effect of undervaluation on the overall utility, 
0c
Φ , is not clear a priory.  The following 
proposition points out some conditions that guarantee a positive affect of the undervaluation policy. 
    Proposition 4. Let  be an autarkic price, and the following inequalities hold: ap
 2/1>α ,                                                    (36) 
 ,                     (37) )/( 212
σσσσσα ApAAp aa +<
where )1/(1 ασ −= . If 2β  is small, and  < q <  then a small undervaluation brings initial 
consumption up as well as overall utility, 
ap
_
q
Φ . 
 
  Proof. Taking into account that )1()( θρλθ −−=− rr , one has from (25) 
.)/(])([)( 2000 λλθθ −′+−′=Φ′ − rrcrccp  
Thus the sign of  coincides with the sign of the function  Φ′
.)(')( 00 rcrcpF ′+−= λ  
In view of (30) and (33), one has from (27) 
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Assume .0, 3 == dpp a  Since 2/1>α , one has  ,)(' 021221220 kDddhADc −= −− ασ αα
where Therefore <0 in view of 
(28). 
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This proves Proposition 4. 
 
Note that the condition (27), (28) seem to be restrictive.  
    One can prove also that if 2β  is small and a balanced rate of return r  is close enough to λ  then 
there exists a small efficient deviation from the balanced trajectory, so that reserves accumulation 
results in an increase of overall utility. Whereas the first condition seems to be reasonable (increase 
of domestic production of consumption goods does not increase knowledge too much), the second 
requirement looks like very restrictive again.  
      In our model accumulated reserves are considered as completely useless. Under this condition, 
the detected possibility of a gain is a paradoxical result. Allowing the use of reserves in distant 
future would make advantages of the reserve accumulation policy much more evident. Net gains of 
FER accumulation could then be demonstrated under much less restrictive conditions.  
   The undervaluation policy may be beneficial even if the conditions formulated above are not 
fulfilled. Our numerical calculations reveal that there is a significant set of parameters under which 
small undervaluation raises overall utility. Fig. 4.2-4.4 demonstrate an example. 
 
4b. Negative trade balance hypothesis 
In the previous section we considered the initial stage of building an export trade sector when 
export externality is comparatively strong.  Assume now that 2β ≥ 3β , and that 
= >0 since foreign investment are effectively attracted due to FER 
accumulation. Thus the trade balance turns out to be positive. 
∆ θλ 10100 ))(( −−− krRb
  In view of the Proposition 1, the function h and the growth rate,λ , are increasing with respect to 
the real exchange rate. Consider again the basic equation (32)  
 DdqAh
αθαα 331 [ −− - . ∆+= ρθ α ]11 DdA
It’s left hand side, , is an increasing functions in the feasible area.  )( pΨ
A balanced solution exists and is unique if the following sufficient conditions are fulfilled 
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The last inequality ensures r)1( θρ −>  (or, equivalently, )r>λ . 
Indeed, for a balanced trajectory the equation (32) entails 
ρ−r = + )DdqAh αθα 331 (− DdA αθ 11 θr<  
if  + DdqA
α
33 DdA
α
11 α< . The left hand side is decreasing and has to be taken at =p qξ . 
 
  Proposition 5. Assume 1232 , ββββ ≥≥ . Then a small FER accumulation increases rate of 
economic growth as well as initial consumption and, therefore, overall utility. This is reached by a 
small real exchange rate overvaluation. 
Proof. Using relation (38) and the theorem condition, one gets 
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Thus, . Since  is increasing, an increase in the right hand side of (32) brings the real 
exchange rate up and accelerates growth. 
0'0 >c )( pΨ
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. 2. Imbalance is better: an example 
 
Parameters: 
A1 0.15:=    A2 0.1:=      A3 0.1:=  
β1 1:=         β2 0.1:=      β3 1:=      ρ 0.05:=     α 0.45:=   θ 0.6:=    q 6:=   Z 2:=  
 
BALANCED TRAJECTORY VARIABLES 
 
P= ξ 4.8777=   I ξ( ) 0.1527= q Y ξ( )3⋅ 0.1528=  
c ξ( ) 0.0593=       h ξ( ) 12.8827=   r ξ( ) 0.1103=    λ ξ( ) 0.1006=   Φ ξ( ) 82.5765=  
Y ξ( )
0.0484
0.0847
0.0255
⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎠
=
  
k ξ( )
0.1976
1.6859
0.1166
⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎠
=  
 
IMBALANCE IS BETTER: 
Φ ξ( ) 82.5765= <  Φ 0.99 ξ⋅( ) 86.9624=
 
        Fig. 4. 3. IMPORT (solid line) AND EXPORT (dotted line) EXPENDITURES 
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              Fig. 4. 4. UNDERVALUATION INCREASES THE UTILTY FUNCTION 
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5. Conclusions 
     The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
of economic growth. It may well be that countries that do not accumulate reserves grow faster than 
the others because of better investment climate, better institutions, greater involvement into 
international trade achieved through greater openness of their economies even though their 
exchange rate is at equilibrium level, etc. It can also be the case that countries accumulating 
reserves are not able to increase their investment/GDP ratios due to high capital flight resulting 
from poor investment climate. Moreover, even if accumulation of FER yields increases in 
investment/GDP ratios the growth of output may still be low due to poor marginal capital 
productivity. This happened, for instance in former centrally planned economies, or, more 
generally, in countries that promoted import substitution, although the example is of limited value, 
since in most of these countries the accumulation of reserves did not occur on any significant scale, 
whereas high investment/GDP ratios resulted from more direct government measures, not from the 
intensive accumulation of reserves and underpricing of the exchange rate.  
     However, the accumulation of FER, as we tried to show in this paper, is a powerful 
macroeconomic mechanism of raising long term growth rates. It is simple, if not to say primitive, 
but this is exactly where it’s major strength lies. It is available to all countries in all periods, even 
when other measures to boost economic growth are not feasible due to political economy reasons or 
require long time for the first dividends to be reaped. If there is nothing else to do in a country with 
numerous government failures, poverty trap and institutional traps, there is at least a chance to 
provide an efficient “big push” to economic development via accumulation of reserves by a central 
bank. Even the most inefficient and corrupt governments can use the reserve accumulation as the 
last resort device to promote growth. 
    The accumulation of FER brings about the undervalued exchange rate, the increase in revenues 
and profits of the export sector at the expense of consumption, and boosts investment and export-led 
growth. The resulting greater involvement into the international trade ensures that new investment 
would not be used to create industrial dinosaurs enterprises of the sort of “white elephants” or 
“Egyptian pyramids” that were often created under the import substitution policy. On the contrary, 
capital productivity and TFP increases due to externalities associated with greater participation in 
the international trade. Besides, FER accumulation that continues for a decade or so appears to 
attract foreign direct investment because low exchange rate makes domestic assets look cheap and 
because foreign investors are impressed by the consistency of the government policy.  
   The main difficulty in the analysis of the FER accumulation policy is the tradeoff between the rate 
of growth and current consumption.  A weak government may be prone to pressure to spend 
reserves immediately for current consumption, even this could undermine long-term growth. 
However, there is a very strong argument in favor of FER accumulation policy, if it raises overall 
consumption. The question about the conditions that guarantee this outcome is not a trivial one.  
   In this paper we were able to make only an initial step in analyzing these conditions. We believe 
we formulated the problem properly, introduced a new concept of real exchange rate 
undervaluation, and demonstrated the possibility of efficient FER accumulation policy. More efforts 
are needed to develop a general theory of FER accumulation.  
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